Why Pakistan’s ruling elites keep harping on two-nation theory

Pakistan Army chief General Asim Munir on April 17 triggered a controversy by saying that there’s a need to instil the ‘two-nation theory’, which led to India’s Partition along religious lines in 1947, in future generations. Addressing the Overseas Pakistanis Convention in Islamabad, Munir urged Pakistanis to share the country's history with their children, stressing that Muslims and Hindus had distinct religions, customs, traditions, thoughts and ambitions. He called Kashmir Pakistan’s “jugular vein” and asserted, “We will not leave our Kashmiri brothers in their heroic struggle.” mediumhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z8g9pws6B9gComing at a time when some parts of India are witnessing protests over the Waqf Amendment Act, his remarks could be an attempt to instigate Indian Muslims besides motivating Pakistan-based terrorist groups to regroup and attempt to create unrest. India brushed aside the remarks, with the ministry of external affairs spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal wondering how anything foreign could be there in a jugular vein. “This is a Union Territory of India. Its only relationship with Pakistan is the vacation of illegally occupied territories by that country,” Jaiswal said.Munir’s invocation of the ‘two-nation theory’ — a foundational ideology championed by Muhammad Ali Jinnah that led to Pakistan’s creation in 1947— emphasised irreconcilable differences between Hindus and Muslims. Critics argue that Munir’s focus on Kashmir was an attempt to divert attention from pressing internal challenges, including the Baloch Liberation Army’s recent attacks.Way back in 1982, India’s strategic guru K Subrahmanyam (father of external affairs minister S Jaishankar) made a very objective and hard-hitting analysis of Pakistan’s obsession with the two-nation theory and the Kashmir issue. TOI published a series of articles by Subrahmanyam who dissected the opinions of various Pakistani scholars emerging from ‘South Asian Dialogue’, a strategic affairs event organised by Pakistan Institute for Strategic Studies (now called Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad) and Quaid-i-Azam University.Edited excerpts from Subrahmanyam’s articles:Pakistani views on two-nation theoryThe issue that stirred deep emotions related to the two-nation theory. An Indian comparison of it with the Zionist thesis drew the sharp rebuke that it was an insult to Pakistani nation and a distortion after India had accepted the two-nation theory.It was pointed to the Pakistanis that as early as 1946 Maulana Abul Kalam Azad had compared the two-nation theory to Zionism and India never accepted the two-nation theory even while accepting the state of Pakistan. It was obvious in the course of the discussion that followed that the Pakistanis were not making any distinction between the demand for Pakistan based on the two-nation theory and the legal and constitutional basis of the Transfer of Power Act. Qaide Azam’s speech to the Pakistan constituent assembly on August 14 1947 was read out to clarify that the founder of Pakistan had not referred to two nations at all but only to the inevitability of the partition as a solution to India’s constitutional problem. On the other hand, he had exhorted that thenceforth there were no Muslims and Hindus but only Pakistanis. If the two-nation theory had been the basis, Mr Gujral (father of Mr I K Gujral who was a participant in the conference) could not have been a member of the Pakistan constituent assembly up to June 1948. If the two-nation theory had been accepted, there would have been no need for holding a referendum in the north-west frontier province and asking the Punjab and Sind legislatures to vote on partition. Without rebutting any of these points, Pakistani scholars argued that rejection of the two-nation theory meant rejection of Pakistan. In reply, it was pointed out that Israel as a state had been accepted by many nations which, however, rejected the Zionist doctrine. To argue that Pakistan as a nation-state could not be accepted without subscribing to the two-nation theory was not logical. The Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China are accented by other nations without the Bolshevik and Maoist doctrines being endorsed. 120427339The Kashmir issue As was to be expected, the Kashmir issue was also raised. The Pakistani scholars cited the advice given by Lord Mountbatten to the princes that they should accede to one of the two dominions taking into account the wishes of the people and the geographic contiguity and argued that since at that time Sardar Patel was in charge of states portfolio, this advice should be treated as binding upon him the Congress and India. Their contention was that in case of Kashmir both geographic contiguity and composition of the population warranted accession to Pakistan. Here again the distinction between advice given to the princes which was not binding on them and the provision of lapse of paramountcy incorporated in the Transfer of Power Act which was strongly supported by Mr Jinnah and opposed by the Congress was pointed out to the Pakistanis. The Pakistanis were also asked why they did not apply the principles of contiguity and wishes of the population in cases of Junagarh and Hyderabad. They in turn cited Junagarh, Hyderabad, Kashmir and Sikkim as instances of Indian hegemonism to get the reply in that case the absorption of Kalat in Pakistan through the use of force would constitute Pakistani hegemonism while in fact all these together constituted consolidation of the two nations in the subcontinent and that given the relative fragilities of the two stales it was not in Pakistan’s interest to reopen these issues. Then came the familiar charge that India reneged on the U.N. resolution on Kashmir. One Indian participant read out the resolution of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan of August 13, 1948, and pointed out that the Indian commitment related to part III on holding a plebiscite but two earlier parts (I and II) related to the withdrawal of Pakistani forces and restoration of the jurisdiction of local administration in areas occupied by Pakistan. These two parts had not been fulfilled by Pakistan till today. In this connection extracts from the report of the Kashmir mediator, Mr Gunnar Jarring, in the fifties wherein he had held that no commitment made by a nation could remain viable when the political circumstances surrounding the commitment underwent changes, were quoted. Towards the end of the conference, one Pakistani scholar made an observation which he himself described as an unpopular view in that country. He said that it was for the Kashmiris to struggle for their own self-determination and there was no point in Pakistan making an issue of Kashmiri self-determination when the latter did not seem to be unduly concerned about it. An Indian delegate pointedly asked whether the two-nation theory continued to be valid today when Pakistan hardly had 30 per cent of the Muslim population in the sub-continent, whether the theory covered the Mulims of India or whether it ceased to be valid with the creation of Pakistan as Qaide Azam’s speech in Pakistan constituent assembly would tend to imply. There was no immediate answer to this question though it was pressed. Subsequently, however, one Pakistani scholar said that the two-nation theory did not apply any longer to the Muslims of India and did not operate after August 15, 1947; but Kashmir was a residual issue arising out of partition and hence the two-nation theory was still valid in respect of Kashmir. 120427359TOI editorial on two-nation theory...We carry an article outlining, among other things, the general Pakistani view on the two-nation theory which the Muslim League in united India had formulated to justify its demand for partition. This discussion exposes, on the one hand, the fear and the calculation which compel the Pakistani ruling and intellectual elites to stick to this theory and, on the other, the complications it creates for them. The fear is that without this “ideological” support Pakistan would lose its raison detre and elan and face the threat of being sucked into the Indian orbit if not the Indian Union itself. The calculation is that adherence to the theory would continue to justify Pakistan’s claim to Jammu and Kashmir. The fear is irrational at least on two counts. Though India helped liberate Bangladesh it did not seek to absorb the latter or abridge its sovereignty. And predominantly Hindu India can have no interest in bringing another 70 million Muslims into its fold when it has not yet been able to resolve the problem of its existing Muslim minority. If the Pakistanis take the worst view of India’s intentions they may be justified in fearing that it would wish to dismember their country. But surely the two-nation theory is no protection against that kind of threat. The appeal to Islam may be more relevant in that connection and that need not be rooted in the two-nation theory. This is especially so in view of the strong Pakistani desire to detach themselves as it were from the sub-continent and seek their fulfilment in close association with fellow Muslims in West Asia. Why then the fear? The answer is obvious. The Pakistanis suffer from an intense feeling of inner insecurity arising out of the fact that Islam has not served as a strong enough adhesive – witness the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign nation and the continuing dissidence in Baluchistan – and that they have not been able to create for themselves a democratic polity of which they could be proud. They suffer in their own esteem when they contrast their failure with India’s success as a democracy. General Zia is trying to meet this problem by establishing what he calls nizam-e-mustafa. But so far this ploy has not worked and it does not look as if it is going to work. The Pakistani calculation regarding Jammu and Kashmir is equally misplaced. The rulers in Islamabad must know that it is beyond their capacity to change the status quo either through negotiations or force. They havd tried both without any success beyond the initial one when within weeks of partition they managed to take India by surprise and seize a part of the state by force. The Pakistanis violated in Junagarh and Hyderabad the principles they invoke in respect of Jammu and Kashmir and they have failed to comply with the U.N. commission’s resolution requiring them to withdraw their troops from the so-called Azad Kashmir. All this is history which we recall only in order to tell the Pakistanis that their case is not all that fool-proof. But even if it were India could not have behaved differently from the way it has for the simple reason that it has not accepted and cannot accept the two-nation theory in view of the presence of 70 million Muslims among its populace. For it to accept that theory is to destroy the very basis of its secular order which alone can assure equality and justice for the Muslim and other minorities.At least some Pakistani scholars recognise that the two-nation theory cannot apply to post-partition India. Implicit in it is the acceptance of the proposition that religious differences are not an insuperable barrier to the triumph of the concept of territorial nationalism in India. This is a mercy for which we should be grateful to the Pakistanis. But it places them in an awkward position. If the two-nation theory does not apply to present-day India, why should it have been valid for India under the British Raj? There are, apart from its status, two differences between the two Indias. Unlike before, India today does not have Muslim majority states with the exception of Jammu and Kashmir; and the Muslims now constitute around 10 per cent of the population against 25 before partition. But these are quantitative differences not qualitative ones and cannot sustain the two-nation theory. The Pakistanis face another awkward problem in that the Islamic concept of the ummah (the Prophet’s community) does not admit of nationalism. But that is their headache. All that we are interested in is to point out the weaknesses of their position and advise them to accept the reality and not try either to alter it or justify it on the basis of an untenable theory. A state does not need an ideological justification. It prospers in peace if it is internally coherent; it survives if its apparatus is strong and united enough to suppress rebellions; and it perishes if it is incoherent and incapable of establishing and maintaining a strong enough coercive machine.