Why Trump Alone Can’t Make Peace

medium118507403Trump campaigned on the promise to end the war in Ukraine. All wars must end, and this terrible war certainly inspires the hope that it will cease or that it will be made to cease. US has been a substantial supporter of Ukraine since Russia’s invasion in Feb 2022, and with this support US has run the risk of escalation, since Ukraine is at war with one of the world’s major nuclear powers. One can see why the American electorate was invested in ending this war.Only a few weeks in office, Trump has made war termination a priority. He has appointed several “China hawks” to his national security team but no “Russia hawks”. Together with senior members of his administration, Trump has restored diplomatic relations with Russia, questioned the role of Europe in sustaining the war and put pressure on Ukraine to accept at least some of Russia’s preconditions for ending this war. It is an abrupt change in US policy, though one that is consistent with the 2024 election results.In short, Trump is entitled to the new approach he has taken. It should not come as a surprise. It echoes some of the arguments he made in his first term as president — about the need for a working relationship with Russia — and it fits within a grand strategy of reorienting US towards the western hemisphere on the one hand, and towards the Indo-Pacific on the other. All foreign policy is about the setting of priorities, and without ambiguity Trump wishes to de-prioritise Europe. What is explicit with him has been implicit to previous administrations in Washington.At best, Trump’s approach will break through the ice of conventional wisdom. Three years in, the war has come to seem interminable. Neither side is able to win, and neither side is willing to lose, while the costs of the war continue to mount and the war’s ripple effects (in the form of inflation and threats to food security) make themselves felt globally. It can make sense to challenge the conventional wisdom, even when there is no real blueprint for action, or when the challenge comes in the form of disruption, a motif of Trump’s second term as president.There is, however, a challenge Trump faces in Ukraine. It can be expressed as an irony. Typically, American presidents find themselves frustrated with their limited powers at home, and they turn their attention abroad. It can be easier to be the commander-in-chief than it can be to deal with the US Congress and the unruly American public. In Trump’s case, he is exceptionally powerful at home, operating as the leader of a political movement with both houses of Congress in Republican hands. Yet Trump is far from all-powerful abroad. The limits of his power in Ukraine are twofold, a matter of persuasion and a matter of global power dynamics.To succeed in ending the war, the Trump administration will need to recognise these limits. First, it will need to persuade the different involved parties not just to come to the table but to trust one another. US does not dominate the battlefield; it cannot dictate terms to Ukraine or to Russia; it cannot compel Europe to do what it does not want to do. US is not a hegemon in Europe. It is merely a powerful country, and without the supreme power of persuasion its hard power will be too distant to bring about peace. The work of building trust is especially difficult given how long and how brutal the war has been. It is doable, but it is not quickly doable.The other limit to American power in Ukraine concerns Ukraine’s place in the world. Ukraine is not only a country in Europe. It is a country embedded in a complicated and evolving global landscape. Before the war, the biggest trading partner of Ukraine was not Germany, and it was not US. It was China. Türkiye, while maintaining cordial relations with Russia, has given Ukraine essential military aid. Some countries far afield from Ukraine have lent their support to Kyiv — Japan, South Korea and Canada for example — and some countries far from Russia have lent their (partial) support to Moscow — Brazil, South Africa and North Korea for example.To end the war, it will be crucial to enlist the participation of China and other major powers, including India. US cannot do it alone. Treaty of Versailles, which was negotiated by a trio of Western powers (France, Britain and US), will not be the template for the diplomacy that terminates the war in Ukraine. This diplomacy will have to be broader in concept and broader in the list of voices that are audible in the negotiations. The Trump administration has the power to convene, the power to put forward ideas and the power to persuade. But to get to the finish line it will need to work in tandem with many different countries, some in Europe and some outside of Europe. Such is the responsibility of 21st century diplomacy.The writer is a columnist based in Washington DC, and director of Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute